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1 Introduction
Economic growth requires both incentives to undertake projects that pay out in the
future and an e¢ cient mechanism to select the best managers to run them. There
is no need to stress that avoiding myopic strategies is often crucial for economic
success. To motivate long-term investment, it is thus important that managers have
su¢ cient prospects to be among those who will enjoy the future returns. At the
same time, however, it is well documented that bad managerial quality can impose
large costs. Having the exibility to remove incompetent managers and workers may
thus be essential too. The role of contracts and institutions regulating production
relationships is to strike a balance between these possibly conicting goals.
To study these issues, this paper proposes a model where economic performance
depends both on long-term investment and the selection of managerial talent. When
ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection
imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk of being replaced tend to choose a sub-
optimally low level of investment. This introduces a trade-o¤ between selection and
investment. The aim of this paper is to study this trade-o¤, how it evolves with the
level of development and the availability of information, and its implications for the
design of appropriate contractual institutions. It will o¤er an explanation for why
countries at early stages of economic development may start with rigid, long-term,
contractual arrangements which sacrice managerial selection, but will eventually
switch to more exible short-term relationships. Thus, the paper will show how
appropriate contractual relationships may change endogenously over the development
process.
Our analysis is motivated by both empirical and theoretical considerations. There
is ample evidence that contractual institutions and production relationships di¤er
markedly across countries and time. For example, state-owned and family rms,
which are typically characterized by long-term relationships and very low manager-
ial turnover, tend to prevail at earlier stages of economic development. While some
authors have emphasized the ine¢ ciencies of such rigid arrangements, others have sug-
gested that they may reect the need for di¤erent institutional forms at various stages
of development.1 In particular, Kuznets (1966, 1973) and Gerschenkron (1962) have
1See, for example, Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003), Caselli and Gennnaioli (2005) and
references therein.
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forcefully stressed that economic growth is accompanied by a process of structural
transformation that includes changes in production relationships and an increasing
importance of skills. In this spirit, we propose a theory where long-term production
relationships may be a second-best arrangement in countries at early stages of de-
velopment and with limited access to information. As the productive capacity of an
economy grows, however, skills become more important and more exible short-term
contracts arise.
In our baseline model, rms and agents last for two periods and produce out-
put by combining a broad form of knowledge capital (productivity) with managerial
skill. In the rst period of the life of a new rm, investors hire a manager to run it.
The manager has access to an investment technology that raises productivity in the
next period at the expense of current production. Managers di¤er in ability, which is
initially unknown. Motivated by our desire to study countries at di¤erent stages of
development, we assume that contracts between investors and managers are incom-
plete and can only take a simple form. In particular, they cannot be made contingent
on outcomes, which is assumed to be non-veriable, and managerial compensation is
determined through ex-post bargaining. Investors, however, have the choice between
o¤ering either one-period or two-period employment contracts.
At the end of the rst period, investors observe the level of production, which
depends on (1) the investment decision, (2) managerial ability and (3) an idiosyncratic
shock (noise), and form expectations on the ability of the manager. Next, if investors
have signed a one-period contract, they may decide whether to conrm the manager or
replace her with a new random draw. In the second period, past investment pays out
and production takes place. After that, a new cycle starts again. In sum, investors try
to retain managers of above average ability, but only observe a noisy signal of ability.
Managers, on the other hand, choose long-term investment in order to maximize their
own payo¤, that depends positively on the cash ow and the probability of not being
red.
With this simple model, we rst study the determinants of long-term investment.
Under exible one-period contracts, there are two distortions inducing managers to
choose a sub-optimally low level of investment. First, the mere possibility of being
red implies that managers may not be able to enjoy future returns and this reduces
their expected benet from investment. Second, as in models of career concern, if
investors only observe current economic performance, managers have an incentive to
3
give up some long-term investment in favor of activities with an immediate payo¤ in
an e¤ort to manipulate the perception of their ability and increase the probability of
being retained.2 Both distortions depend on the fact that managers face a non-zero
probability of being replaced. Hence, they represent the costs of being able to keep
good managers and replace bad ones. The benet of selection, on the other hand, is
that it ensures on average higher managerial ability.
Next, we turn to study how this trade-o¤between selection and investment shapes
the optimal choice of contracts. More precisely, we ask under what circumstances
long-term (two period) contracts sacricing managerial selection may be more e¢ -
cient. We nd that rigid contracts are optimal when information is very noisy, ability
is concentrated and the productive capacity of the economy is low. These are cases
in which selection is either di¢ cult or not very useful, while investment is relatively
more valuable. It is then desirable to maximize investment, even at the cost of lower
managerial quality. The model thus suggests long-term contracts to prevail in de-
veloping countries with low levels of phisycal and human capital, and poor access
to information.3 Yet, as the productive capacity of the economy grows endogenously,
managerial ability, which is a complementary input, becomes relatively more impor-
tant and short-term contracts implementing selection become optimal. Interestingly,
we nd that this transition is faster in countries with better institutions in the form
of a richer menu of contracts and less severe informational frictions.
This paper contributes to the theoretical literature, still in its infancy, on appropri-
ate institutions and growth.4 In particular, the evolution of contractual relationships
along the process of development has so far received little attention. Closest to ours
is the inuential paper by Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006). In their model,
skill is assumed to be more important for innovation than for the adoption of foreign
technologies. As a result, selecting talent becomes more useful as countries get closer
to the technology frontier. Our analysis is both complementary and has a di¤er-
ent focus. First, we provide a micro-foundation for the trade-o¤ between investment
2See Stein (1989), Holmstöm (1999) and Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) for models of
career concerns.
3However, long-term contracts may also be optimal in societies that are very homogeneous. Japan
may provide an interesting example.
4This literature has been pioneered by the works of Douglas North (see, for example, North,
1994). Among others, recent contributions focusing on economic institutions are Rodrik (2007),
Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999 and 1997), and Aghion
and Howitt (2005).
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and selection. Second, we study its implications for the choice between contracts
of di¤erent rigidity, while they analyze the e¤ect of competition policy at various
stages of development. The trade-o¤ between selection and investment is also the
subject of Aghion, van Reenen and Zingales (2008). They argue, both theoretically
and empirically, that institutional ownership reduces managerial turnover in case of
bad performance and promote investment in innovation. However, their paper does
not study the optimality of institutional ownership.5
Our paper is also related to the relatively small literature on incomplete contracts
and growth. Acemoglu, Antras and Helpman (2007), and Francois and Roberts (2003)
study how contractual frictions a¤ects technology adoption and innovation, respec-
tively. Hemous and Olsen (2010) argue that repeated interaction may help to overcome
the static costs associated with limited contractibility, but at the cost of dynamic in-
e¢ ciencies. Di¤erently from these papers, we are interested in studying how growth
a¤ects the form of contracts, rather than the opposite. Closer to our spirit, Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (1999) study how information may be accumulated along the process of
economic development and how this a¤ects risk sharing, managerial e¤ort and eco-
nomic performance. Yet, they do not consider alternative contractual forms, while
we abstract from the issues related to risk sharing.
Finally, the literature on law and economics documents the prevalence of family
rms and rigid contractual relationships in developing countries and in particular
where enforcement is weak. Theoretical papers explaining this fact argue that family
rms arise in the presence of weak institutions (see Mork, Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2005
for a survey). None of the existing papers, however, study the endogenous evolution
of optimal contractual arrangements. We instead abstract from enforcement problems
and issues related to rm ownership and organization. The corporate nance litera-
ture addresses various aspects of the contracts between managers and shareholders.
For instance, Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2009)
study the equilibrium level of executive compensation and its performance sensitivity
in advanced countries. Giannetti (2011) considers the optimal compensation scheme
when the outside option of an executive is misaligned with the performance of the
rm. Other contributions (see Benmelech, Kandel and Veronesi, 2007, and references
therein) focus on the optimal CEO pay structure, and investigate which instruments
5Thesmar and Thoenig (2000) study the trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and adaptability in a model
of organization choice and growth. We instead abstract from organizational structures.
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better align the interest of managers and shareholders. Our aim is to embed some of
these ideas into a growth model and study how optimal contracts change with eco-
nomic development. For this reason, we depart from the corporate nance literature
by focusing on simple and incomplete contracts that are more likely to be used in
developing countries.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays down a simple growth
model, describing the set-up and the choices that agents face, and illustrates the main
trade-o¤between selection and investment. Section 3 solves the model under symmet-
ric information and studies how the optimal contractual arrangement (long- versus
short-term contract) varies with the level of development and with other parameters.
We also consider how the choice between a richer set of contracts may speed-up the
transition to exible relationships. Section 4 introduces an additional informational
friction by assuming investment to be unobservable and show how this may delay the
transition from long- to short-term contracts. Section 5 provides a discussion of our
main assumptions and empirical implications. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We propose a simple growth model designed to study the agency problem between
investors and managers in a world where managerial ability is not perfectly observable
and contracts are incomplete. The model gives rise to a trade-o¤ between selection
and investment, with implications for the choice of contracts between the principal
(investors) and the agent (the manager).
2.1 Agents, Preferences and Technology
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of two-period lived agents.
Similarly to Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006), each generation consists of a
mass L=2 of investors, who are endowed with ownership claims on new rms, and a
mass L of managers, who have no wealth but are endowed with heterogeneous skills
required to run rms. All agents are risk-neutral and discount the future at the rate
 2 (0; 1). In every period, a mass L=2 of new rms equal to the new cohort of
6The literature on optimal manegerial compensation argues that managers should be given a
long-term contract specifying state-contingent payments. In the absence of commitment, Clementi
et al. (2006) show how stock grants may substitute for state-contingent contracts. In the present
paper, we assume that contractual ine¢ ciencies prevent the use of complex compensation schemes.
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investorsenters.7 Firms run for two peridos and produce a single nal good, which
is taken as the numeraire. Therefore, at any period t, there is a mass L of active rms
(young and old) and total output is given by:
Yt =
Z L
0
yjtdj;
where yjt is production of rm j at time t.
New rms start out with an initial level of productivity, which we call knowledge
capitaland we denote kjt, randomly drawn from a distribution with positive support
and mean equal to the average knowledge capital of existing old rms. We assume
that kjt is observed by all agents upon realization. The level of knowledge capital
is the key state variable of the model, capturing the broad productive capacity of
the economy, and it will grow endogenously over time. Besides kjt, each rm requires
one manager to be operated. Hence, when a new rm starts, a manager is chosen
randomly from the population of young managers.8 The manager of a young rm
has access to an investment technology that converts units of current output into
new knowledge capital at t + 1. In particular, ijt units of current-period production
invested at t yield f (ijt) units of additional knowledge capital at t + 1, where the
function f () satises the regularity conditions: f 0 () > 0, f 00 () < 0 and f 0 (0) =1.
Investment in knowledge capital by rms will be the only source of growth in the
model.
Managerial ability, j, which is assumed to be unknown, is drawn from a normal
distribution with mean  and variance 2:
j  N
 
; 2

:
Ability a¤ects production, it is manager-specic and persistent. Production is also
a¤ected by a random idiosyncratic shock, "jt, drawn from a normal distribution with
zero mean and variance 2":
"  N  0; 2" :
We assume the shock " to be independent of ability and uncorrelated across projects
7The exact allocation of property rights on new rms among new investors is irrelevant. The fact
that the number of rms is exogenous has no bearings on the main results.
8As it will be clear later on, hiring an old manager to run a new rm is never optimal.
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and time, so that it captures an unpredictable component. Both the distribution of j
and " are common knowledge, but their actual realizations are not directly observable.
Thus, production of a young rm at time t is:
yjt = (j + "jt) kjt   ijt:
Note that yjt can be thought of as the cash-ow generated by the rm.9 This cash-
ow is then distributed between managerial compensation, as specied below, and
dividends to investors and it is consumed (there is no storage). Upon observing yjt,
which is a noisy signal of managerial ability, and depending on the type of contract
o¤ered (one-period or two-period employment), investors will form expectations on
the ability of the manager and may decide whether to replace her with a new random
draw or not. Given that red managers are expected to have a low ability, they will
never be hired by other rms and all new managers will be drawn from the pool of
previously idle managers (recall that there are twice as many potential managers than
rms).
At time t+1, the knowledge capital of a rm born at t is equal to the initial level
plus the return from investment:
kjt+1 = kjt + f (ijt) :
Since rms terminate after the second period, old rms do not make any further
investment and their production is simply:
yjt+1 = (t+1 + "jt) kjt+1;
where t+1 is the ability of the previous manager or, if replaced, a new random draw
from the distribution N (; 2). At the end of the second period, the rm exits and
the manager is dismissed.
9One possible interpretation for ijt is intra-period borrowing from old rms. Alternatively, it
could capture resources taken from the managers time endowment, which is normalized to zero.
In an earlier version of the paper, we consider the case in which ijt substracts from kjt, so that
production is yjt = (j + "jt) (kjt   ijt).
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Finally, the total stock of kowledge capital of new and old rms at time t is:
Kt =
Z
j2St
kjt +
Z
j2St 1
[kjt 1 + f (ijt 1)]
= Kt 1 + 2
Z
j2St 1
f (ijt 1) ; (1)
where St denotes the set of new rms at time t. The second line make use of the
assumption that kjt for new rms is drawn from a distribution with mean equal to
the average knowledge capital of existing old rms, so that
R
j2St kjt =
R
j2St 1 kjt.
Equation (1) is the key law of motion of the economy.
We now discuss the managerial contract. First, we assume that contracts are in-
complete in that they cannot be made contingent on outcomes, such as ijt or yjt.
This may be due to the inability of the legal system to verify output and invest-
ment. As a consequence, every period the project cash ow is split between managers
and investors through ex-post Nash bargaining. For the time being, we assume that
managerial bargaining power is exogenous and equal to  2 (0; 1). This means that
managerial compensation is a fraction  of the cash ow, yjt.10 The fraction  is
public information. As an extension, in section 3.6 we let  vary over the lifetime of
the rm and be chosen optimally.
Second, the contract may grant investors the option to replace the manager before
the termination of the rm. In particular, under exible short-term contracts, the
manager is evaluated at the end of the rst period and is replaced if the expectation
of her ability, conditional on observing the noisy signal yjt, is too low. Alternatively,
managers and investors may sign binding long-term contracts that do not allow for this
type of managerial turnover. In the remainder of the paper, we study and compare the
properties of these alternative contractual arrangements. Before doing so, however,
we formally describe the investment choice by mangers and the inference problem
that investors face.
10This assumption is relatively standard in the literature on incomplete contracts.
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2.2 Managers and Investors
The manager chooses investment ijt in order to maximize her expected life-time utility,
which is a fraction  of the discounted cash-ow of the rm:
max
ijt
Ujt =  [E (yjt) + pjtE (yjt+1)] ; (2)
where E is the expectation operator and pjt is the perceived probablity that the
manager running rm j at time t will be not be red at t + 1. The maximization is
subject to the constraints:
yjt = (j + "jt) kjt   ijt
kjt+1 = kjt + f (ijt) :
Substituting these into (2) we can rewrite the problem as:
max
ijt
Ujt= = kjt   ijt + pjt ( + jt) [kjt + f (ijt)] ; (3)
where we have used the fact that E (yjt) = kjt ijt and E (jt+1 j jt+1 = jt) = +jt
is the expected ability of a manager conrmed in the second period. The term jt will
be positive if managers that are retained are expected to have a higher ability than
the average. This will happen if short-term contracts are chosen and will represent the
benet of being able to select managers. As we will see shortly, jt will also depend on
the dispersion of managerial talent and the precision of the signal of ability observed
by investors. Note that, when making the investment choice, the manager ignores
her ability, but knows the distributions of  and ", and the equilibrium expressions
for pjt and jt (to be derived later).11
The rst order condition for ijt is:
pjt ( + jt) f
0 (ijt) = 1   [kt + f (ijt)]

@pjt
@ijt
( + ) +
@jt
@ijt
pjt

: (4)
11For simplicity, we have normalized the outside option of idle managers to zero. Alternatively,
we could have assumed that idle managers can be employed as workersin a nal sector that uses
labor and Y as inputs, or that ability is rm-manager specic and that red managers are re-hired
by other rms. These alternative assumptions would only make the notation more cumbersome.
Without loss of generality, we also do not allow managers to compete for contracts.
10
The left-hand side of (4) is the expected marginal benet of investment for the man-
ager in terms of higher production at t + 1. This is equal to the marginal product
of investment, ( + jt) f 0 (ijt), multiplied by the discount factor and the probability
that the manager will be retained. The right-hand side of (4) is the marginal cost
of investment. The rst term is foregone production today. The second term is the
marginal impact of investment on the probability of being retained (@pjt=@ijt) and on
the selection premium (@jt=@ijt), multiplied by the discounted value of running the
rm in the second period. As we discuss more in details later on, the term @pjt=@ijt
will be negative if investors do not observe ijt. In this case, the manager has an
incentive to invest less so as to inate the current cash ow in an attempt to appear
more competent and therefore increase the probability to be conrmed at t + 1. By
distorting the signal observed by investors, the manager may also in principle a¤ect
their ability to select e¢ ciently good managers. Yet, an envelope condition guarantees
that this e¤ect is nil so that @jt=@ijt = 0.12
Investors face an inference problem. They must form expectations on the ability
of the manager conditional on observing the noisy signal yjt = (j + "jt) (kjt   ijt).
Investors know the initial knowledge capital and either observe the investment made
by the manager or can infer its equilibrium level, so that they e¤ectively observe
the sum j + "jt. Given the distributions of  and ", that are assumed to be com-
mon knowledge, we can compute the posterior expectation of j, conditional on
observing j + "jt:
bjt = E [j j j + "jt] = 2"
2 + 
2
"
 +
2
2 + 
2
"
(j + "jt) : (5)
That is, the posterior expectation on managerial ability is a weighted average of the
prior, , and the observed signal, j+"jt, with weights that depend on the precision
of the signal: as the variance of the noise (2") increases relative to the variance of
ability (2), the signal becomes less and less informative and the posterior expectation
converges to the unconditional mean . Note also that the distribution of the posterior
belief on the managers ability is normal:
bjt  N ; 4
2 + 
2
"

: (6)
12More details on this are provided in section 4, where we consider the case of unobservable
investiment.
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Intuitively, bjt has the same mean but a smaller variance than .
Finally, investors want to maximize the expected present discounted value of their
share of the rm, V (kjt), given the available contracts. This is given by the present
value of expected production, net of the managerial compensation, (1  )E [yjt + yjt+1]:
V (kjt)
1   = kjt   ijt +  ( + pjt) [kjt + f (ijt)] : (7)
3 Symmetric Information
We now characterize the equilibrium outcome under alternative contractual arrange-
ments assuming that investment is observable to all agents. We relax this assumption
in section 4. To start with, we focus on symmetric equilibria where all new rms have
the same amount of knowldge capital, kjt = kt. In section 3.5, we consider the cross-
sectional implications of our model when kjt is instead drawn from a non-degenerate
distribution.
3.1 Long-Term Contracts
Suppose that a two-period contract is signed. Then, investors are not allowed to
replace the manager at the end of the rst period. In this case, we have pjt = 1,
 = 0 and @pjt=@ijt = @jt=@ijt = 0 so that the rst order condition for investment
(4) becomes:
f 0
 
iL

=
1

; (8)
where the superscript L denotes long-term contracts. Intuitively, investment is in-
creasing in patience () and in average ability (), because the return to investment
is proportional to the expected ability of the manager who will run the rm at t+ 1.
Note that under long-term contracts there is no selection so that the ex-ante expected
managerial ability in the second period is just the unconditional mean :
3.2 Short-Term Contracts
We now consider the case in which investors sign one-period contracts and are thus
free to replace the manager. The optimal strategy for the investors is to re the
manager if her expected ability, conditional on observing yjt and ijt, is below the
population average. Thus, the probability that a manager is retained is equal to
12
the probability that the posterior belief bjt is greater than , or equivalently, the
probability that the signal is above its mean:
pjt = Pr
bjt   = 1
2
:
Since information is symmetric and ijt observable, managers cannot manipulate
the signal of ability by reducing investment. It follows that @pjt=@ijt = 0 and
@jt=@ijt = 0. In equilibrium, the rst order condition (4) for ijt = iSt becomes:
f 0
 
iS

=
2
 + 
: (9)
Before discussing the determinants of investment under short-term contracts, we
rst need to solve for the equilibrium value of , i.e., the di¤erence between the
expected ability of a conrmed manager and a new draw. Conrmed managers tend
to be of above average ability ( > 0) because a realization of yjt above the mean is
more likely to come from a high ability manager, although there is always a chance
that it comes from low- type with a lucky realization of the shock "jt. Formally,
given that a manager is retained whenever her ability is expected to be above ,
the average ability of a conrmed manager is equal to the mean of the distribution
of the posterior belief bjt truncated below at : Using the properties of the normal
distribution we obtain:
E
h
j j bjt  i = 1
1 H ()
Z 1

bdH b =  + 22p
2 (2 + 
2
")
;
where H is the c.d.f. of the posterior belief bjt (6).
Thus, the selection e¤ect, i.e., the expected ability premium of a conrmed
manager, is:
 =
22p
2 (2 + 
2
")
: (10)
Note that selection is more e¤ective (high ) when the signal is not too noisy (low
2") and ability very dispersed (high 
2
). Intuitively, when there is little noise, the
probability of keeping (replacing) by mistake a bad (good) manager is low, thereby
raising the benet of selection. On the contrary, when talent is very concentrated,
there is little to gain in conrming a manager, even when she is expected to be of
above average ability. High heterogeneity in ability makes instead selection a powerful
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tool.
3.2.1 Incentives and Investment
We now study the determinants of investment, iS. Since f 00
 
iS

< 0, the left hand
side of (9) is decreasing in iS. It is then easy to characterize investment as a function
of the model parameters.
Lemma 1 Investment under short-term contracts is an increasing function of hetero-
geneity in managerial ability (2), average ability () and patience (); it is decreasing
in the variance of noise (2").
@iS
@2
> 0;
@iS
@
> 0;
@iS
@
> 0;
@iS
@2"
< 0
Proof. See Appendix
Not surprisingly, investment increases with patience, . Heterogeneity in ability,
2, increases investment since it raises the managers expected ability conditional on
being conrmed in the second period () and thus the marginal return from iS, which
is proportional to E (jt+1). Similarly, for given 2, a higher average ability also raises
the marginal return to investment, thereby inducing a higher iS. An increase in the
variance of the shocks, 2", makes selection less e¤ective ( falls), thereby inducing a
lower investment.
Comparing the rst order conditions under alternative contractual arrangements,
(9) and (8), we see that the benet of selection under short-term contracts may come
at the cost of a lower investment. This is because of two contrasting forces. On
the one hand, we have just seen that the selection premium  increases the value
of investment. On the other hand, the manager will benet from investment with
probability p = 1=2 only. More precisely, we have that investment under short-term
contracts is lower than under long-term contracts (iS < iL) as long as the selection
e¤ect does not outweighs average ability ( < ). When  > , instead, short-
term contracts entail higher investment because the expected ability of a conrmed
manager (hence productivity) is so high that the manager prefers to increase second
period production (through higher investment) even if she only has a 50% chance
to enjoy the returns. In this case, short-term contracts do not impose any trade-o¤
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between investment and selection. For this reason, from now on we focus on the more
interesting case  < .
3.3 The First Best
Before comparing the relative performance of short- and long-term contract, it is
useful to characterize the rst-best solution that would be attained if investment
were veriable and thus contractible. In this case, investment iFBt would be chosen
so as to maximize the expected present discounted value of the rm. Moreover,
to maximize second-period productivity, investors would keep the right to replace
managers if they produce less than the expected average kt   iFBt . This happens
with probability one-half since ability is symmetrically distributed around its mean
and shocks are i.i.d.. Thus, the rst best investment solves:
max
ijt
kt   ijt + 

 +

2

[kt + f (ijt)] :
The rst order condition is:
f 0
 
iFB

=
1
 + =2
(11)
where  is still given by (10).
From conditions (8), (9) and (11) it is immediate to see that iL < iFB and iS <
iFB. Thus, contract incompleteness always implies underinvestment relative to the
rst best equilibrium. The reason is that long-term contracts exclude the benecial
e¤ect of selection on the return to investment, while short-term contracts introduce
myopia in managerial behavior. Moreover, in the benchmark case  < , we have
iS < iL < iFB.
3.4 Appropriate Contracts and Economic Development
We now compare the relative performance of short- and long-term contracts and study
how the optimal contractual form changes along the process of economic development.
As long as  < , long-term contracts maximize investment, but sacrice managerial
selection; on the other hand, short-term contracts allow on average to replace bad
managers, at the cost of underinvestment. Thus, the choice between alternative
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contracts poses a trade-o¤between investment and selection. To study it, we evaluate
the expected present discounted value of new rms (7) in the two cases:
Long-term:
V L (kt)
1   = kt   i
L + 

kt + f
 
iL

;
Short-term:
V S (kt)
1   = kt   i
S + 

 +

2

kt + f
 
iS

where  is given by (10). Rearranging these expressions, we nd that short-term,
exible, contracts are ex-ante optimal, i.e. V S (kt) > V L (kt), when the following
condition holds:

f
 
iL
  iL  f  iS  iS <  (=2) kt + f  iS : (12)
The left-hand side of (12) is equal to the additional surplus from investment generated
by long-term contracts. This term is always positive because iL is chosen precisely
to maximize [f (i)  i]. The right-hand side is the benet of selection. Condition
(12) holds, i.e., short-term contracts are better, when selection is relatively more
important than investment. In fact, it holds trivially when there is no investment,
(e.g., f (it) = 0), while it is always violated when the benet of selection is nil ( = 0).
We next ask how capital accumulation a¤ects the optimal choice of contract. As
formalized in Proposition 1, capital accumulation makes short-term contracts more
attractive.
Proposition 1 There exists k such that V S (k)  V L (k) for any k > k.Proof.
See Appendix
Intuitively, ability becomes relatively more important as the economy grows be-
cause of its complementarity with the level of technological sophistication captured
by knowledge capital. For this reason, the higher the productive capacity of the
economy, the higher the value of selecting talent to operate new technolgies. Key to
this property is the assumption that managerial ability has a multiplicative e¤ect on
technology, as in the majority of models designed to study the e¤ect of managerial
quality (e.g., Rosen, 1981, and Gabaix and Landier, 2008). It is also consistently with
the large literature on capital-skill complementarity (e.g., Krusell et al. 2000) and
skill-biased technical change (e.g., Nelson and Phelps, 1966, Caselli, 1999, Violante,
2002, and Acemoglu, Gancia and Zilibotti, 2011).
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Since investment is non-negative and new rms start with the same knowledge of
existing old rms, kt grows continuously over time. In particular, in the symmetric
case we focus on, the knowldedge capital of each existing rm at time t+ 1 is:
kt+1 = kt + f (i) ; (13)
where kt and it are the knowledge capital and investment of a new rm at time t,
respectively. This implies that, for any parameter value, the economy reaches k in
nite time. Thus, Corollary 1 immediately follows.
Corollary 1 For any parameter value, there exist a time t such that V S (kt) 
V L (kt) for all t  t.
Our model thus predicts that countries starting from a low level of capital may
go through an initial phase where long-term production relationships and low man-
agerial turnover are optimal. Once kt reaches a critical threshold, however, ability
becomes more important and the economy will endogenously switch to exible short-
term contracts. Appropriate contractual institutions may thus evolve with economic
development as suggested by Kuznets (1966, 1973), Gerschenkron (1962) and North
(1994).
We now discuss the e¤ects of other parameters on the choice of appropriate con-
tracts, and hence the speed of transition, in the non-trivial case  < .
Proposition 2 The expected di¤erence in the PDV of a rm under short-term rel-
ative to long-term contracts, V  V S(kt) V L(kt)
1  , is increasing in the variance of the
ability distribution (2) and decreasing in the variance of the shock (
2
"). The e¤ect
of average ability () on V is instead ambiguous, but it is necessarily positive for
low values of :
@V
@2
> 0;
@V
@2"
< 0
@V
@

!
> 0:
Proof. See Appendix
The intuition behind the results in Proposition 2 is as follows. A rise in the vari-
ance of managerial talent makes short-term contacts relatively more e¢ cient because
a high 2 increases the selection premium  in (10), which raises V
S (kt) both directly
and indirectly through the rise in iS. Moreover, it is easy to show that, if there is no
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heterogeneity in talent (2 ! 0), the selection e¤ect () is nil, hence rigid contracts
are always preferable. If ability is dispersed enough (2 ! 1) instead, the selection
e¤ect grows very large ( ! 1) thereby making short-term contracts optimal. The
latter result is formalized in a Corollary:
Corollary 2 For any parameter value, there exists b2 > 0 such that short-term (long-
term) contracts are optimal for all 2 > b2 (2 < b2).Proof. See Appendix
This suggests that more homogeneous societies (i.e., with a low ) will stay longer
in the development phase characterized by long-term contracts. In turn, this result
may help explain why relatively rigid production relationships may be common even
in some advanced country where workers are less heterogeneous (an example could be
lifetime employment policies in Japan) and in some traditional sectors where ability
matters less.
The e¤ect of 2" (variance of noise) is to make it more di¢ cult to separate good
from bad managers, thereby reducing the benet of selection  and the managerial
incentive to invest under one-period contracts. It is easy to show that, if the noise is
high enough (2" ! 1), there is no benet from selection ( ! 0) so that long-term
contracts must be optimal, regardless of the level of development. As noise tends to
zero (2" ! 0), the benet of selection converges to its maximum ( !
p
22=),
thereby making (12) more likely to hold. Hence, improvements in the availability of
information such as more transparency in business procedures or a better monitoring
technology speed up the transition to exible contractual institutions.
Finally, the possibly ambiguous e¤ect of average ability () is the resultant of
two forces. On the one hand, the complementarity between k and  means that
investment is more valuable the higher ability is. This force tends to make long-term
contracts optimal for high , because they maximize investment. On the other hand,
due to the same complementarity, a higher  raises investment and therefore also the
value of selecting good managers, which is proportional to the knowledge capital they
operate with. When ability converges to the lower bound of its relevant range ( ! ),
investment is the same under both contracts so that the rst e¤ect disappears.
3.5 Firm Heterogeneity and the Transition to Short-Term Contracts
So far we have emphasized the implications of the model for cross-country comparison.
By adding heterogeneity across rms and sectors, the model can shed light on cross-
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industry comparisons as well. To this end, we rst relax the assumption that all
new rms start with the same level of knowledge capital. Suppose then that kjt is
observable and it is drawn from a non-degenerate distribution, Z (k), with mean equal
to the average knowledge capital of existing old rms. Given that investment does
not depend on the level of kjt, we still have ijt = i so that the law of motion of the
average knowledge capital in the economy, (13), is una¤ected. Moreover, condition
(12) and Propositon 1 also hold, meaning that the threshold level of knowledge capital,
k, above which short-term contracts become optimal is the same as before. The
di¤erence is that in each period there will be a fraction Z (k) of new rms who
prefer to choose long-term contract. Yet, as the mean of Z (k) grows over time
with knowledeg accumulation, the fraction of rms below k will shrink, converging
eventually to zero. Thus, the main novelty of this version of the model is that it
generate a smooth transition along which exible contcats are rst chosen by the
most productive rms and then gradually adopted by all the others.
Following the same logic, we can also assume that rms are grouped into di¤erent
sectors, indexed by i, each characterized by a di¤erent volatility 2"i and possible
di¤erent investment technologies fi (k). In this case, investment will be sector-specic,
but it is straightforward to see that the general properties of the model will still hold.
Introducting this additional dimensions of heterogeneity allow us to obtain both cross-
rm and cross-industry predictions. In particular, the modied model suggests that
rigid contractual relationships should tend to prevail among less productive rms, in
more traditional sectors where skills matter less, and in industries where ability is
harder to observe.
3.6 Varying Bargaining Power
Although contract incompleteness precludes contingent contracts, a recent literature
(e.g. Hart, 1995 and references therein) has argued that actions a¤ecting the allo-
cation of bargaining power between parties may improve incentives. In this spirit,
we now consider a richer institutional framework that lets the bargaining power of
managers and investors be allocated di¤erently across the rst and second period. In
particular, we assume that  still denes the minimum bargaining share of managers.
For instance, this may be the fraction of cash ow that the manager can hide and ap-
propriate without being prosecuted. However, investors may have the option to raise
the managerial bargaining power associated to the age of the rm: 1 2 [; 1] and
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2 2 [; 1]. We now study how this institutional improvement a¤ects the e¢ ciency of
contracts and the transition studied above.
Under long-term contracts ( = 0), the level of investment that maximizes the
PDV of a new rm must satisfy the condition f 0
 
iL

= 1=. This is precisely
the investment chosen by a manager with a constant bargaining power, i.e., (8).
It is therefore immediate to see that the optimal choice for rm owners is to set
1 = 2 =  so as to obtain the e¢ cient level of investment and maximize their share
of rents. Intuitively, in this case there is no reason to change managerial incentives
because, conditional on no selection, long-term contracts already yield the optimal
level of investment. Thus, the possibility to tilt the power of the manager has no
impact on the performance of long-term contracts.
Under short-term contracts, the managers problem (3) becomes:
max
it
1 (kt   it) +  1
2
2 ( + ) [kt + f (it)] ;
where we have already substituted pt = 1=2. The rst order condition is
f 0
 
i

=
1
2
2
 + 
: (14)
Not surprisingly, investment is increasing (decreasing) in the second (rst) period
compensation, 2 (1) and the comparative statics for the other parameters remains
the same as in the previous sections.
If investors can choose 1 and 2, they may have an incentive to give up cash ow
(by raising 2) in order to foster investment. In particular, they would set managerial
bargaining power so as to maximize the expected present discounted value of their
own share in the project:
max
1;2
(1  1)
 
kt   i

+  (1  2)

kt + f
 
i

 +

2

; (15)
subject to (14) and 1 2 [; 1] ; 2 2 [; 1].
Given that raising 1 reduces both current investorsshare of cash ow and in-
vestment, it will always be set to its minimum . The rst order condition for 2 is
20
instead:


 +

2

kt + f
 
i
  f 0  i (1  2) + 
2

  (1  )

@i
@2
: (16)
with equality if 2 > . The left-hand side of (16) represents the marginal cost of
increasing second-period managerial bargaining power, which is proportional to the
second-period cash ow. The right-hand side captures the net marginal benet of
higher 2 through the rise in investment that it generates. Obviously, if the solution
is interior (2 > ), then investorswelfare must be higher than under the simpler
short-term contracts of section 3.2 (V S (kt) > V S (kt)), because they could could
have chosen 2 = . The interesting question is then to study under which conditions
the optimal solution is the corner. This will be the case (2 = ) if the marginal
cost of rising 2 above its minimum is higher than its marginal benet, i.e., if (16)
holds with inequality after using 2 =  and (14). As we show in the Appendix, this
condition reduces to:


kt + f
 
iS
 
1   >

2 + 

2
 + 
2
  1
f 00 (iS)

: (17)
Inspection of (17) reveals that this condition will be satised, so that the solution with
variable managerial bargaining power coincides to the simple short-term contract with
2 = 1 = , as knowledge capital grows, ability gets more dispersed and noise falls,
i.e., when investment becomes relatively less important than selection. Moreover,
varying the bargaining power is a less useful instrument when managers already have
high control over the rms cash ow (high ). From (16), it is also possible to
see that, starting from a situation in which the optimal 2 is higher than , 2 will
converge monotonically to  as kt or 2 grow, and 
2
" falls.
This result is consistent with the notion that ex-ante e¢ ciency requires that a
higher bargaining power should be allocated to the party that makes the most im-
portant task (e.g., Hart, 1995). In the context of the present model, we can think of
investment as a task performed by managers and selection as a task performed by rm
owners. When investment is more important than selection, namely when knowledge
capital is low, ability is homogeneous and noise is large, the manager should be given
relatively more bargaining power, while the opposite happens when selection is more
relevant.
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In sum, we have shown that the choice of 1 and 2 does not a¤ect long-term
contracts, while it (weakly) improves short-term contracts (V S  V S). Moreover,
the trade-o¤between investment and selection under alternative contracts is typically
preserved and the economy converges necessarily to the benchmark case 1 = 2 =
 as k grows. The new important result is that short-term contracts will become
preferable to long-term contracts for a smaller level of knowledge capital than in
section 3 and hence the transition will be faster.
4 Asymmetric Information
We now assume that investment is unobservable to the investors. This allows us to
study the trade-o¤ between short- and long-term contracts in an environment with
more informational frictions. It is immediate to show that this asymmetry has no
bearings on long-term contracts. Under short-term contracts, instead, asymmetric
information introduces an additional distortion in the choice of investment due to
a career-concern motive. In particular, managers will invest less in an attempt to
manipulate the signal of their ability and hence their conrmation probability. In
equilibrium, however, investors will correctly foresee the behavior of managers and p
will still be one-half.
Unobservability implies that investors will rely upon equilibrium investment iUt ,
instead of observed investment, when extracting the ability signal from the rms
performance yjt. Therefore, a manager will be retained if the project cash ow, yjt, is
higher than the expected cash ow generated by a manger with average ability doing
the expected equilibrium investment, iUt :
(j + "jt) kt   ijt  kt   iUt :
As before, the probability that the manager is conrmed is equal to the probability
that the realization of the random variable (j + "jt) is high enough:
pjt = Pr

j + "jt   + ijt   i
U
t
kt

= 1 G

 +
ijt   iUt
kt

; (18)
where G is the c.d.f. of j + "jt  N (; 2 + 2") : The new result is that, as (18)
shows, the manager can deviate from the equilibrium strategy iUt in ways that are
unobserved by investors and, by doing this, she will distort the signal extraction
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problem of investors and a¤ect pjt:
@pjt
@ijt
=   1
kt
g

 +
ijt   iUt
kt

:
Intuityively, investing less than expected increases expected yjt and thus the proba-
bility of conrmation in the second period.
In equilibrium, however, expectations are rational so that iUt = ijt, pjt = p =
1
2
and:
@pjt
@ijt
=  g ()
kt
=   [2(
2
 + 
2
")]
 1=2
kt
: (19)
Note that g () is just the density of j+"jt at the mean. Given that investors correctly
foresee the equilibrium choice of the manager, the signal extraction problem they face
is una¤ected by unobservability of ijt. This means that they form the best possible
estimate of j, so that the selection premium jt is still equal to (10). Given that,
conditional on not observing j + "jt, the investors maximize managerial ability at
t+ 1, any marginal deviation of ijt from iUt only has second-order e¤ects on selection
and @jt=@ijt = 0.
Using these results, the rst order condition for iUt , (4), becomes:
f 0
 
iUt

=
2
 + 
+ 2
"
1 +
f
 
iUt

kt
#
g () : (20)
Comparing (20) with the rst order condition in (9) gives a measure of the distortion
brought about by unobservability of investment. In this case, selection is more costly
in terms of foregone investment since, with @pjt=@ijt < 0, managers are willing to
give up some investment in favor of current production in an e¤ort to manipulate the
perception of their ability and increase the probability of being retained. Thus, the
unsuccessful attempt to manipulate the signal of ability introduces a short-run bias
in investment so that managers invest less under asymmetric information: iUt  iS.13
Equation (19) shows that this bias is strong when kt, 2 and 
2
" are low, that is when
yjt is more sensitive to the choice of ijt.
As in section 3.3, short-term contracts are more e¢ cient if and only if condition
(12) is satised after replacing iS with iUt . Also here, we will focus on the non-
trivial case in which long-term contracts yield higher investment than short-term
13See Holmstrom (1999) and Stein (1989) on how career-concers may laed to short-termism.
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contracts: iUt < i
L. It is can be shown that the results in Proposition 1 and Corollary
1, stating that as capital is accumulated societies switch to short-term contracts,
still holds. Moreover, since investment under short-term contracts is lower when
ijt is unobservable while  is the same, we have that V U < V S for any parameter
value and capital is accumulated at a lower rate. This implies that asymmetric
information unambiguously slows down the transition to short-term contracts (k
and t are higher).
The e¤ect of other parameters on the speed of the transition to short-term con-
tracts is similar (but not identical) to the case of symmetric information. As before,
heterogeneity in managerial talent improves the relative performance of short-term
contacts. This happens because a high 2 increases the selection premium  and i
U
t ,
both raising V U (kt). Moreover, it is easy to show that Corollary 2 still applies. The
e¤ect of " (noise) is instead now more complex. On the one hand, a higher noise
reduces the incentive to underinvestment in an e¤ort to manipulate the signal (see
equation 19). This e¤ect tend to increase iUt and V
U (kt). On the other hand, a high
noise reduces the benet of selection, . Given that lim2"!1  = 0, it is straightfor-
ward to prove that long-term contacts must be optimal for su¢ ciently high noise.
For lower values, however, the e¤ect of changes in 2" on V
U (kt) may be non-linear.
Numerical analysis suggests that a lower noise (i.e., improvements in the availabil-
ity of information) speeds up the transition to exible contracts in countries with
enough heterogeneity of talents, while they might slow down the transition in very
homogeneous societies.
5 Discussion
Before concluding, we pause to briey discuss some of the key assumptions maintained
in our model and to draw some empirical implications of our theoretical results.
5.1 Assumptions
Following the incomplete contract literature, we have excluded contracts contingent
on production due to a lack of veriability, but we have abstracted from commitment
issues too. That is, we have assumed that legal enforcement is imperfect, but so-
phisticated enough to make the choice of one or two period contracts binding. For
the purpose of the paper, namely, to study the observed persistence of long-term
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production relationships in less developed countries, our approach seems a natural
compromise. In fact, in the absence of any commitment technology, rigid contracts
would be harder to implement. The reason is a time consistency problem. Even if
investor would like to promise reappointment ex-ante, in order to induce the optimal
investment, they may want to deviate ex-post. Once investment is realized and yjt
observed, investors will form expectation on the ability of the current manager. If
this ability happens to be below the average, investors are better o¤ in expectation by
replacing the manager with a new draw. Thus, for long-term contracts to arise, there
must be institutions that can enforce the original promise not to re the manager.
To circumvent the problem, if private contracts are di¢ cult to enforce, the gov-
ernment may provide commitment by choosing labor market institutions that impose
long-term relationship. Examples of this might be policies of tenured or lifetime em-
ployment. Alternatively, if there is no enforcement mechanism to sustain long-term
contracts, it is possible that family rms, where the manager is also the owner of the
rm, could provide a solution to the commitment problem. Provided that managerial
compensation is large enough, the owner of a family rm will keep its control un-
less his managerial talent is very low. Thus, family rms may arise when long-term
contracts are optimal, but not enforceable.14
Second, in the interest of simplicity, we have restricted the investorschoice (and
their ability to commit) to short- versus long-term contracts only. In a richer environ-
ment, investors may be willing to sign two-period contracts that specify a severance
pay in case the manager is replaced. The e¤ect would be to increase the probability
of keeping a manager above one-half and thus the incentive to invest, at the cost of
less selection. Our model captures the essence of this trade-o¤without the additional
complications that this form of limited commitmentwould pose.
Third, we have assumed that managers choose investment without knowing their
own ability to avoid some complications that can arise in signaling games. Our
assumption is relatively standard in models of career concerns (e.g., Holmstrom, 1999)
and can easily be relaxed in the benchmark case with symmetric information.
Finally, in modeling the growth process, we have chosen to use an investment
technology which features diminishing returns to knowledge accumulation. For this
reason, the long-run growth rate of the economy converges asymptotically to zero,
14More generally, our model suggests that lack of commitment may be more costly in less developed
countries where long-term contracts would be optimal.
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although it always remains positive. While none of the main results depends on this
assumption, it is consistent with the abundant evidence on conditional convergence,
i.e., the fact that ceteris paribus poor countries tend to grow faster than rich coun-
tries and it seems particularly appropriate to study economies at di¤erent levels of
development. Interestingly, in the presence of a positive depreciation or obsolescence
rate of knowledge capital, the model economy will converge to a stady-state level
of k. In this case, the switch to short-term contracts will not be inevitable and will
depend on whether the steady-state level of knowledge capital is above k. Countries
converging to di¤erent steady state, for example because of di¤erences in patience or
in the accumulation technology, may therefore end up with persistent di¤erences in
contractual arrangements.
5.2 Empirical Implications
The main theoretical result of the paper is that short-term production relationships,
whereby bad performance leads to managerial turnover, are more likely to prevail at
higher stages of development, where transparency in corporate governance is higher,
and managerial ability is more dispersed. Besides being consistent with the broad
view by Kuznets (1966, 1973) and Gerschenkron (1962), which formed our original
motivation, these preditions can be confronted with a number of cross-country and
cross-rm empirical studies.
Cross-country data would lend support to the model predictions if: (1) higher
economic development raised the likelyhood that bad rm performance leads to CEO
termination; (2) controlling for development, better corporate law and practice (e.g.,
disclosure requirements, informativeness of stock prices) raised the likelyhood that
bad performance leads to CEO termination. Several contributions in corporate -
nance study the determinants of managerial turnover. Among these, De Fond and
Hung (2004) show that CEO termination is more performance sensitive in countries
with better corporate governance and where stock market prices are more informa-
tive, which we can interpret as a lower 2" in our model. Lel and Miller (2008) provide
evidence that rms from weak investor protection regimes that are cross-listed on a
major U.S. Stock Exchange, which are subject to severe disclosure requirements (low
2", in our model), are more likely to terminate poorly performing CEOs. The same is
not true for rms that cross-list in the London Stock Exchange, which has less severe
requirements.
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Moving to cross-rm data, the version of our model with heterogeneous knowledge
capital and di¤erences in other parameters across industries predicts that short-term
contracts should prevail: (1) in larger rms, (2) where managerial ability is more
dispersed, or production is more complex so that managerial ability matters more;
and (3) idiosyncratic risk is lower, or investors have better control/information. Con-
sistently, Zhou (2000) provides evidence that large Canadian rms are more likely
to terminate their CEO after bad performance than small rms. Although measures
of cross-sectional variation in complexity and idiosyncratic risk are available (e.g.,
Castro, Clementi and MacDonald, 2009), there are to our knowledge no studies re-
lating them to the performance sensitivity of managerial turnover at the rm level.
Finally, the basic trade-o¤ between investment and selection, which lays at the heart
of our theory, is consistent with the ndings in Aghion, van Reenen and Zingales
(2008), that increased institutional ownership is positively correlated with innovation
and negatively correlated with the incidence of performance-driven replacement of
managers in a panel of US rms.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have built a simple growth model where economic success requires
both incentives to undertake investments that pay out in the future and managerial
selection. Investment is relatively more important at early stages of development,
when productive capacity is low. It is then optimal to choose long-term contracts
that maximize the incentives to invest, even at the cost of no managerial selection.
As knowledge capital grows, ability becomes more important and the economy en-
dogenously switches to short-term contracts that maximize managerial talent, even
at the cost of some underinvestment. We have also studied how other parameters af-
fect the speed of the transition. Another result of our analysis is that countries with
better institutions and less informational frictions will experience a faster transition
to short-term contracts.
Our model can be used to analyze the e¤ects of policies that improve the avail-
ability of information. For example, nancial development may bring about a better
monitoring technology that lowers the amount of noise in the economy. Likewise,
nancial openness may allow investors to hold claims on foreign rms and this may
provide access to privileged information, such as balance sheets and investment re-
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ports. By comparing economic performance of rms in the same sector in di¤erent
countries, investors may acquire information on global sectorial shocks and reduce
the noise in the ability signals they observe from managers. Thus, by reducing un-
certainty, nancial development and nancial openness may speed up the transition
to exible contracts, improve selection and increase managerial ability. These results
can help rationalize the ndings in Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) and Bonglioli
(2008) that nancial development and liberalization spur productivity, particularly
in developed countries, but not investment.
The results in this paper have been obtained with the help of a stylized model that
abstracts from several potentially interesting issues. Given that the resulting frame-
work has proven to be tractable, we hope it can serve as a building block for future
extensions. Among these, two stand out as particularly prosiming. First, endogeniz-
ing the ability distribution may open the door to multiple equilibria and development
traps. The reason is that with long-term contracts ability is less important so that
managers may have a lower incentive to invest in activities, such as education, that
could increase talent. At the same time, this may lead to a more compressed ability
distribution that in turn justies the adoption of long-term contracts. This may help
explain why some countries appear to be trapped in a no-selection, low-human capital
equilibrium.15 Second, as already mentioned, an interesting extension is to include
ring costs in the model, so as to nest the short-term and long-term contracts as
special cases (corresponding to zero and prohibitive ring costs, respectively). This
would allow us to study intermediate regimes where p can be increased continuosly
at the cot of lowering . Although the model may lose some analytical tractability, it
could be used for studying the optimal level of ring costs. Finally, the cross-country
and cross-sectoral predictions discussed in the previous section may be the starting
point of future empirical work.
15Hassler and Rodriguez-Mora (2000) make a related point using a di¤erent model.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Re-write the rst order condition for optimal investment under short-term contracts,
eq. (9), as
I  f
0  iS
2
  1
 + 
= 0:
This equation denes investment as an implicit function of the other variables and pa-
rameters of the model. To prove Lemma 1, we compute the derivatives of investment
with respect to patience (), ability dispersion (2), noise (
2
") and average ability
():
@iS
@x
=  @I
@x

@I
@iSt
where
@I
@iS
=
1
2
f 00
 
iS

< 0:
Lemma 1 follows from:
@I
@
=
f 0
 
iS

2
> 0;
@I
@2
=
1
( + )2
@
@2
=
1
( + )2
2 + 2
2
"
22 (
2
 + 
2
")
  0;
@I
@2"
=
1
( + )2
@
@2"
=   
2

(2 + 
2
")
3
2 2
p

 0;
@I
@
=
1
( + )2
> 0:
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
To prove Proposition 1, we only need to show that the di¤erence between the PDV
of the project under short-term and long-term contracts, V  V S(kt) V L(kt)
1  , is in-
creasing in the stock of capital, kt. The derivative of V w.r.t. kt is
@V
@kt
=  (=2) > 0:
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7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
To prove Proposition 2, rewrite V as:
V =

f
 
iS
  iS  f  iL  iL+  (=2) kt + f  iS :
Then, we study how V changes with 2, 
2
" and . First:
@V
@2
=
@iS
@2



 +

2

f 0
 
iS
  1+ @
@2

2

kt + f
 
iS

=
@iS
@2

 + 
+
@
@2

2

kt + f
 
iS

> 0;
where we have used the rst order condition (9) and the sign follows from @iS=@2 > 0
and @=@2 > 0. Second, following the same steps as above we obtain:
@V
@2"
=
@iS
@2"

 + 
+
@
@2"

2

kt + f
 
iS

< 0;
because @iS=@2" < 0 and @=@
2
" < 0. Finally:
@V
@
= 

f
 
iS
  f  iL+ @iS
@



 +

2

f 0
 
iS
  1
= 

f
 
iS
  f  iL+ @iS
@

 + 
;
where we have used the rst order conditions (8) and (9). The rst term in square
brakets is negative, because iS < iL. Lemma 1 shows instead that the second term
is positive. As  !  we have iS ! iL so that the negative term converges to zero.
Thus, for low values of  (recall that we are focusing on the interesting range  > )
we obtain @V
@
> 0:
7.4 Proof of Corollary 1
For 2 close to zero the selection e¤ect () tends to zero, hence
lim
2!0
V =

f
 
iS
  iS  f  iL  iL < 0;
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since f (i)   i is maximized at iL. At 2 such that  ! , we know that iL = iS
so that V =  (=2)

kt + f
 
iS

> 0. Then, since V is increasing in 2 and
continuous, a value b2 > 0 must exist such that V > 0 for all 2  b2.
7.5 Optimal managerial bargaining power
Take the rst order condition for investment in the case of short term contracts:
f 0
 
i

=
1
2
2
 + 
:
Using implict di¤erentiation yields:
@i
@1
=
1
f 00
 
it
 1
2
2
 + 
< 0
@i
@2
=   1
f 00
 
it
 1
(2)
2
2
 + 
> 0:
Next, take condition (16) and substitute (14):


1 +

2

kt + f
 
i

>
1  
 + 
@i
@2
:
Finally, substitute @i=@2 to obtain (17) in the text.
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